Space Wars: A.D. 1990-A.D. 2030

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In the last half of the 20th century, the rate of technological progress went nonlinear. Political, economic, and social change went from sporadic to constant, and a new era—the Transformation Age—was christened. However, the rift has widened between those who have prospered and those who have not. The world now faces a new definition of war. Wars will be shorter and have limited objectives, but they will be more violent. In the spirit of the new definition of warfare, I offer the following scenario.

A.D. 2030

I just got off the phone with my son, an anti-satellite platoon leader in the U.S. Space Corps. He called to tell me about recent action in the conflict in central Asia. To be quite honest, I found his account hard to follow. As I get older, it is harder for me to understand warfare.

When I was commissioned in the 1980s, the world was so much simpler. We knew who the enemy was, and we knew what to do if he crossed the line. Then someone erased the line.

As I reflect on my years of service, I see that I was a transition figure. My career began in combat arms during the Cold War, continued through the beginning of the U.S. Army's transformation, and ended in space command. I knew as much about space when I was a lieutenant as Billy Mitchell knew about air power when he was a lieutenant in 1904.

It took warfighters over a quarter of a century and a world war to figure out the basic principles governing air warfare, and it took them almost the same length of time to understand space warfare. Here is how it happened.

A.D. 1990

During Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf War, I often wondered exactly where I was. Company headquarters had a global positioning system (GPS) receiver somewhere in the mortar section, but only the mortar section fire direction center specialist knew how to use it. He was the ultimate techno-weenie, and the commander always gave him any new toys to play with first.

Once, when I asked the specialist for a pinpoint location, he told me there would not be enough satellites overhead to get a location until later that evening. My exact location did not really matter. In the desert I could wave to adjacent units from anywhere in my platoon sector, and I could see farther than I could shoot with any of my organic weapons.

If I called for fire, I could be 500 meters off and still adjust onto the target quickly. The 1:100,000-scale map in my pocket had a contour line every 50 kilometers or so. Platoon graphics were about the size of my fingernail at that scale.

Once when visiting the battalion tactical operations center, I was surprised to see a small satellite radio antennae. The battalion signal officer (SIGO) and a noncommissioned officer (NCO) were huddled over it, trying to get it to work. The SIGO said it did not matter if it worked or not; they did not need satellite communications anyway—maybe a brigade or division did, but not a battalion.

I learned all about Scud launches and frequently participated in launch-reaction drills. I had no idea how warnings got to my company sector. I wondered how many seconds of warning I would get in the event of an actual launch. My company commander did not know either, but thought it was at least a few minutes.

During an intelligence briefing, the battalion S2 passed around some pictures of potential target areas. The pictures were stamped SECRET. The captain explained that these were satellite photographs and could not be shown to allies. He also said to refer to them as images rather than photographs and that no one could have copies.

A.D. 2010

As the director of Space Operations on the Central Command (CENTCOM) staff, I again found myself in the Middle East. I was visiting the commander of U.S. peacekeeping forces in the Israeli theater of operations.

I was there to ensure the general staff was getting all the space products and support it needed. The commanding general was glad to see me and wasted no time in telling me his concerns. He specifically asked me to look at the missile warning system and the computer network defenses.

The senior Space Forces officer, an Army lieutenant colonel (LTC), had been a Space Forces officer since being promoted to major. His cell consisted of one space operations (functional area (FA) 40) major, three space operations captains, and four FA 40-series NCOs.

The captains were new to space, having been assessed as Space Forces officers under a new process borrowed from the acquisition corps. Space Forces operations had broadened so much that the Army was considering moving to the branch-detail concept to begin building space experts even earlier in their careers. I hoped branch-detail officers would be able to keep their muddy boots foundation.

The LTC briefed me on the situation. Position navigation and timing (PNT) was not a problem. The GPS satellite constellation was still healthy, and the availability of other PNT assets added considerable

redundancy. The receivers could process signals from multiple systems and were small enough to be worn on one's wrist. Every key leader could determine at any moment his position within 20 meters. And, without having to synchronize his watch, he knew what time it was to the exact second.

Once diplomatic hurdles were cleared, fiber optic lines were to be installed, possible within 24 months. Until then, the force was using the venerable mobile subscriber equipment system and the single-channel ground and airborne radio system for most of its communications.

Key officers were issued global-access voice/data cell phones. The phones were small and rugged, but Department of Defense (DOD) users could easily push the system to capacity with high-band-width demands. The space section was working communication disruption contingencies for the upcoming solar max. However, satellites were much tougher than they used to be, so it was low priority.

The Space Forces control officer then briefed me on the command's space control operations. He and his NCO did not usually participate in space control missions. They were the space forward observers responsible for calls for fire. From their workstations they could contact any space control operator and request a mission. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) performed as the space fire direction center, clearing most fires or gaining clearance from the National Command Authorities and sending the mission to the firing unit.

The computer network operations (CNO) officer, who had a master's degree in computer science, was a natural at his job. He briefed the network's intelligence preparation of the battlefield and gave a full ran down of the defenses in place throughout the command. I thought he was a little too eager to mix it up with the enemy, as junior officers often are. I tried to impress on him the significance of a network "shot fired in anger" despite the fact that there were no bloodshed or graphic television images.

I was somewhat familiar with the array of offensive weapons, but I did not feel comfortable with my knowledge of CNO. Congress was on the verge of creating a new CNO unified command. CNO had grown from a small joint task force to a huge national effort, and the commander in chief (CINC) of space operations (CINC-SPACE) was ready to spin it off.

The team's missile warning officer described the linkages between CENTCOM missile warning assets and command posts in theater. There were no hardwire linkages from the CENTCOM missile-warning element to task force headquarters, but broadcast messages, coupled with ground-based radar enhancements, were quite reliable. Each soldier in the theater carried a missile warning pager, which considerably shortened the warning time. The missile warning officer suspected the general's discomfort arose from some of the test results of the pager system. There were always a few soldiers who were not carrying their pagers, who forgot to turn them on, or whose pagers had dead batteries.

The final brief was from the noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), who also headed the team's imagery production. Imagery production had changed dramatically in the last 10 years. The latest software automatically searched every imagery database in DOD and automatically tabulated the "collects" available for a specified time in the future. All the NCOIC need do was enter search criteria, and within a few seconds, thumbnails of every image—some only 10 minutes old—would appear. High-quality images could be printed in less than two minutes.

In an outbrief with the commanding general, I suggested that the pager-system problem could be one of leadership and training rather than being solely equipment related. I assured him that the CNO officer's enthusiasm for offensive operations had not hurt defensive preparations, which were up to doctrinal standard. He asked me to work with the CENTCOM staff to determine how to exercise computer-network defenses without disrupting real-world operations.

On the flight back to McDill Air Force Base, I realized that I would probably never return to Southwest Asia. My thoughts drifted back to my days as a lieutenant during the Cold War. Things had turned out differently than I had expected. What would the world be like in another 20 years?

A.D. 2030

My son always listens politely to my stories of the Army's good old days. During those days, lieutenants carried laminated paper maps and magnetic compasses and talked on radios so heavy another soldier had to carry them. Today, he told me he would have appreciated such simple tools of war. He is on his second job in the U.S. Space Corps, which supports the U.S. Air Force in the "Space Littoral."

The United States had resisted the temptation to weaponize space until China surprised the world by employing a space-based laser against a terrorist missile headed toward Beijing. China's action broke the dike of public opinion, and the United States released the flood of its technological and industrial might to produce an amazing series of offensive and defensive weapons.

My son's first assignment had been to a microsat fleet control unit. The boring shift work made him long for the type of adventures I had always described. He wanted to see the effects of his actions with his own eyes instead of on a screen or holograph.

His career had gone well. He had applied to the elite 1st Space Composite Wing, which was composed of one squadron of space planes with space-to-space and space-to-ground capability, one squadron of weather controllers, and one squadron of ground-to-space weapons. Active combat in space and from space was no longer unusual.

On his last operation, his unit had flown a transport plane to Antarctica. His platoon's mission: to conduct a space ambush against "Molniya" orbiting satellites while they were in low orbit over the South Pole. To succeed, his platoon had to temporarily cripple communications with mobile launch units spread across

the Asian continent

Every member of my son's platoon carries equipment with which to communicate worldwide by voice and data, to collect intelligence, to compute data, and to maintain nearly perfect situational awareness (SA). All communications devices are completely secure and unjammable. However, top minds commanding top dollars are working hard to develop technology that could intercept and disrupt such messages. CINCCNO and CINCSPACE operate continuously, keeping regional CINCs informed but often after the fact.

I had spent my entire career chasing the "perfect SA" only to see it happen after I had retired. My son tries to explain how decisions are just as hard to make now despite the fact that commanders know the location of every friendly and most enemy units. Enemy intentions remain unknowable, even when it is possible to have a fairly accurate picture of unit locations and movements, when it is possible to eavesdrop at will on enemy communications, and when it is possible to read enemy plans almost as soon as they are written. If the enemy reacted logically and there was no chaos, the mission would be easy. But humans are not logical, and battlefields always have friction.

My son also can tap directly into spaceborne reconnaissance assets and "sense" any part of the world in real time across the electromagnetic spectrum or by radar. Requesting and tasking are things of the past. If clouds block an area, the weather control squadron can fix it. Unfortunately, deception efforts have also become much more creative.

Although the missile versus missile defense arms race cost nearly a trillion dollars, the United States can now disable ballistic and cruise missiles at any time from seconds after launch to seconds before impact. A group of engineers at one of the country's most prestigious institutes of technology is working on a space weapon that could electronically hijack a cruise missile in flight and redirect it. But, there are no guarantees, and the cost of a single failure is dramatic.

The United States used a missile "defense in depth" with reconnaissance, warning, and active defenses that included many different weapons systems. The principles of war still applied. ***MR***

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Operation Assistance: Canadian Civil Power Operations

Colonel W. Semianiw, Canadian National Defence

Canada's military forces have a long history of coming to the aid of civil powers during national emergencies. In every instance, military forces cooperated closely with civil authorities to accomplish necessary tasks. This was also the case during Operation Assistance, when Canadian Forces (CF) gave support to the Manitoba government during the flood of 1997—Canada's "flood of the century."

The First Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry of Calgary, Alberta, deployed to an area of approximately 500 square kilometers south of Winnipeg, Manitoba, north of Grand Forks, North Dakota. The area included five regional municipalities (RMs) each with its own elected rural official (Reeve). Each RM, under the direction of its Reeve, was the lead agency in local operations. All CF units were to support and assist the RMs. The operation provided many lessons learned from aiding civil powers during a natural disaster.

Players and Boundaries

At the tactical level, the players during the flood crisis included varied groups of government and nongovernment, civilian, and commercial interests. In Manitoba this included the Reeve, his public administrator, the local fire department, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (provincial jurisdiction), the Ministry of Natural Resources, Manitoba Hydro, Manitoba Telephone, Manitoba Highways, Manitoba Emergency Measures Organization (EMO), and the mayors and councils of affected towns. That lines of operation crossed municipal, provincial, and federal jurisdictions quickly became evident. Each agency had its own area of responsibility and coverage, but areas often overlapped, thus increasing the strain on coordination. However, agencies that aligned along municipal boundaries or in congruence with the lead agency found their support efforts simplified and streamlined.

The tasks the military were to perform centered on general duties such as filling sandbags, building dikes, or performing rescue, traffic control, or escort duties. Because large urban and county areas would be uninhabited, providing armed security was, at first, viewed as a probable task. However, this did not prove to be necessary. Sufficient police resources were available and were deployed effectively to permit or deny access to controlled areas.

To achieve the tasks expected of them, the military organization of company, squadron, and battery, with their inherent mobility, communications, and general-purpose soldiers, proved to be best suited for the tasks that were to be conducted.

Military Force Organization

During the staff planning process, planners arrived at two options for the organization of military forces in support of civil authorities. Military forces could take a centralized approach in which the unit would

control and allocate resources to civil authorities based on the task, or they could take a decentralized approach in which each RM would be assigned a slice of the pie. Situation analysis revealed that a decentralized approach would be best because it best fulfilled the need for simplicity, time, and space; unity of effort; and unity of command and control.

Rifle companies "in support." Rifle companies were allocated in support to RMs. Major towns, where dikes had been built before the flood, received as a military point of contact, a liaison officer (LO), who was generally a senior noncommissioned officer.

Twining a rifle company with an RM and placing an LO in each town proved to be effective. Civil authorities in each RM and the towns preferred to work with the same commander for all aspects of the operation. Local officials and military commanders developed relationships and dependencies that proved beneficial. Also, military commanders became versed in the nature of the crisis and the needs associated with their RMs and towns.

Each RM and town had its own way of fighting the flood and supporting its residents. Personnel stability in civilian and military associations and cooperation was vital. The situation required a military force that was flexible in dealing with differing needs, requirements, and demands within the same military hierarchical level. Military companies were employed in various and differing tasks at any given time.

Platoons "in reserve." German military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz's principle of maintaining a reserve at the tactical level for unforeseen events seems to be incongruous when applied to a natural disaster.[1] However, the need for a reserve to meet unexpected crises was evident. The enemy was the water, which hourly continued to cause more suffering and create more crises. A large force could not sit waiting for a task when there was so much suffering and so much to do.

The solution was to designate a single platoon-size reserve to be used extensively during the operation. In addition, each rifle company would have the task of supporting any of the other rifle companies and RMs, if needed. To achieve this second requirement, rifle companies passed platoons from one company to another, as required, which allowed the losing company headquarters to remain with its designated RM to maintain the critical military-civilian link throughout the operation. Doing this also allowed a surge capability, if needed, in any one of the RMs.

Decentralized Command and Control

With a decentralized approach to organization came a decentralized approach to command and control, which in Canadian doctrine is known as mission-type orders, or *Auftragstaktik*.[2] Subordinate commanders needed maximum flexibility since demands within each RM were specific to that particular RM because of social and geographical reasons.

The tasks encountered focused on the small-party tasks of team or section size. In most cases, commanders operated in isolation and were expected to make decisions at a moment's notice without referring to a higher authority. Therefore, a decentralized approach that provided broad guidance—or "left and right of arcs"—was the only viable solution.

The only limitation in supporting a particular RM was that lives were not to be put into jeopardy for equipment. This broad guidance allowed commanders to react to the various situations on an hour-to-hour basis.

Preparing task lists and prioritizing tasks was the responsibility of the lead agency and the applicable Reeve of the RM, with advice from the EMO representative—not the military. The task list then passed to the military commander for action. This chain of command mechanism ensured that the command and control relationship was maintained. Not doing so would have had legal ramifications.

Within this framework, the military provided advice and planning assistance for preparing the task lists. That the military's planning abilities and capabilities were just as useful as labor and materiel support quickly became evident.

Coordination

With so many government and nongovernment agencies involved, coordination of activities became paramount. Each RM and major town organized a flood-control center. Although called by different names and organized in their own way, the centers served the same purpose—to coordinate all aspects of flood assistance and relief.

The flood-control centers quickly became the focal point for disseminating information. It was not uncommon to find residents boating for an hour on a daily basis to visit the flood-control center to learn the latest news or to contact friends and neighbors.

To ensure effective coordination, military headquarters collocated with flood-control centers, which allowed an effective interface with various government and nongovernment agencies. Doing so ensured that resources were not double-tasked but pooled and shared for maximum use. For example, Manitoba Natural Resources and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police used their own boats and helicopters to augment military resources.

Force Multiplier

In many respects, tactical airlift by helicopter proved to be the operation's greatest force multiplier. Without it, support to civilian authorities would have been delayed and, many times, not possible. Although an agency might have had resources available, to be effective the resources had to be at the right place at the right time. During a natural disaster, seconds and minutes determine an operation's success. Helicopters reduced reaction times substantially.

Helicopter tasks included reconnaissance, liaison, rescue, and airlift. The Jet Ranger/Kiowa and the Labrador/Chinook were the workhorses of the operation at the tactical level. They greatly helped all government and nongovernment agencies complete tasks, and they ensured the mission's timely completion.

One of the most startling conditions RMs faced was the peculiar and difficult-to-understand phenomenon of residents' reluctance to leave their

homes, even when threatened with the loss of life. Residents have strong attachments to the homes that represent their lives and livelihoods. Counteraction of this reaction demands a prepared and rehearsed rescue plan that includes the continuous monitoring of civilians in threatened areas.

Lessons Learned

The key lessons learned during the operation included the following:

- Military boundaries should be aligned with the boundaries of the civilian government that is being supported.
- Tasks should focus on general-labor tasks, in which the company, squadron, battery, and general-purpose soldier will prove the most effective.
- Stability in civilian-military personnel relationships during such operations is necessary.
- Civilian and military authorities must maintain continuous liaison.
- A reserve must be designated.
- Commanders must receive broad guidance within which to work in order to accomplish the many tasks they will encounter.
- The lead agency should be responsible for preparing and prioritizing task lists.
- One body that includes all government and nongovernment departments should coordinate, effect support, and direct overall actions from one location.
- All agencies should share equipment.
- Tactical airlift in the form of the helicopter should be used extensively as a force multiplier.
- Evacuation plans should be prepared and rehearsed and include daily monitoring of civilians in threatened areas. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Random House, 1943), 155.
2. For the definition of Canadian Forces mission-type orders, see B-GL-300-002/FP-000, *Land Force Tactical Doctrine,* 1-9.

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Shaping Leadership Skills in Poland's Army

Lieutenant Colonel Andrzej Bujak and Major Zdzislaw Sliwa, Polish Army

Issues connected with leadership are among the main dilemmas of the military method of commanding troops. Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Poland's armed forces have experienced many changes. Therefore, leadership issues are especially important and challenging. Poland's joining the NATO alliance structure, with Poland's new political situation and all past and present problems as well, necessitates a new look at the Polish army's leadership.

Education is Key

The most important issue is the gap between the present understanding of theories and the practice of leadership. Major changes in understanding leadership must occur among professional soldiers in military units at every level as well as in the military-education system. The Polish army must create opportunities to educate future leaders on how to meet current challenges as well as future expectations. Only by educating leaders can we be confident that we can provide good leaders to fight future battles, participate in peace operations, deal with natural disasters, and be prepared to face any challenge. Good, professional leaders, educated to international standards, are key to military success during peace or war.

Polish commanders now have much broader access to international literature then when Poland was part of the Warsaw Pact. Because of this, Polish soldiers have gained language skills and received education in NATO, United States, and other Western institutions.[1] As a result, Polish army leaders are learning more about effective leadership. However, it is still too early for the army to completely implement new procedures for developing and preserving leadership, at least in regard to preserving a standard the army wants among commanders at all organizational levels. Especially difficult is the practical implementation of the desired attitude among leaders and soldiers. The overall leadership problem is often comprised of a lack of knowledge of leadership theory, a lack of understanding of the tools of leadership, and a painful lack of taking the leadership problem seriously enough.

Command and Leadership

Understanding the definitions of the words *command* and *leadership* is essential for commanders.[2] Is command the same as leadership? In general, command is defined as an authority that is assigned formally: a commander is nominated to the function of commanding a group of soldiers. He has a right and obligation to command, but by his actions he must perform according to regulations, adopted schemes, and procedures.

On the other hand, leadership is a type of authority based on personal characteristics; that is, it is the way the commander influences soldiers' behavior. Effective leadership results in the voluntary, unforced honoring of a commander's authority by subordinates. A great leader can convince soldiers of his competence, professionalism, and creativity. Moreover, such a leader usually earns soldiers' unrestricted support.

Commanding is a bilateral relationship of mutual influence between at least two people, and there is a clearly defined dependence between them. The leader is a person who leads other people. Followers follow the leader because of internal motivation or necessity, not because of formal requirements.

The most important element that defines a natural leader is the skill to organize people around him to

achieve clearly defined goals accepted by all participants. Because each person in the group identifies with the goals, it should be guaranteed that each team member would perform more than expected to achieve common goals. Good leaders can often influence people to cross the barrier of their personal interests and capabilities to tap into latent values and energy.

The Practice of Military Leadership

Compared with the past, the new Polish army has demonstrated much greater interest in the practice of military leadership. However, its focus is still not strong enough. The lack of clearly defined rules of personal management is clearly a drawback. Also, the average standard of living of Polish professional soldiers, and the discomfort they experience, is a challenging factor. Even "some of our (Polish) regular military cadres experience some economic inadequacy and, sometimes, find better earnings outside the armed forces."[3]

Neither problem is easy to solve in a short time. As a result, some characteristics necessary for good leadership, such as commitment, are still difficult to achieve by many Polish officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

Other problems connected to the commander's role are moral issues within Polish society and a general lack of respect for authorities. These are a legacy of the last social system and the changes the country is continuing to experience. Such attitudes are particularly serious for young citizens. They must by law serve in the military as conscripts. Because of social changes, the young people treat this obligation rather perfunctorily.

Given such an atmosphere, leadership is quite difficult, especially when trying to mobilize, incorporate, and motivate soldiers for extra effort. Trying to force young soldiers to manifest initiative, responsibility, or innovation in all kinds of military activities is difficult.

The desired effect of a leader's influence on his soldiers is to cause them to conquer the barriers of self-interest to work for the common purpose of squad, platoon, or company. Simultaneously, soldiers should work effectively for their self-development. To gain such results, the commander must find appropriate methods to inspire and encourage soldiers to additional effort. The leader must challenge them to a higher level of expectations and requirements and show his confidence in their knowledge, skills, and responsibility. Unfortunately, we more often see a lack of confidence in subordinates' skills than we see help and trust.

In this rather new and difficult situation the Polish armed forces are trying to find appropriate solutions and approaches. Based on research in the Polish Army, especially by Colonel Bogdan Szulc of the National Defense Academy in Warsaw, there are specified personal matrices and characteristics a good commander must have. Among those characteristics are the following:[4]

- Behavior and attitude.
- Moral and personal courage.
- Self-confidence that builds confidence.
- Initiative.
- Honesty and credibility.
- Objectivity when judging subordinates and situations.
- Common sense in decision-making.
- Loyalty.

In addition to these, every real commander should be experienced in and capable of influencing his surroundings. The skills mentioned above are not permanent gifts given a person; they must be developed during service. Good theoretical knowledge in leadership has critical value to the successful application of the skills.

To perform their duties successfully, leaders must strive for these skills. Therefore, it is vital to identify such characteristics in young leaders. Shaping competent leaders is possible, but doing so requires the student-leader to have received appropriate education and training during all types of soldier-development activities, such as during instructor-commander courses.

According to assumptions, cadets in Polish military academies and schools receive instruction in some leadership skills beginning on their first day of education in a military academy or school and continuing throughout the education process. The process is based on shaping obedience; self-discipline; physical skills and resistance; patriotism and respect for national values; ethics and morality; and skills connected with interpersonal communication.

At present, the theoretical basis or foundation of a few courses that concern leadership is changing in Polish military academies and schools. The idea is to broaden knowledge in the area of human behavior.[5] Such topics include such soft-science disciplines as psychology, sociology, and pedagogy; organization and management; ethics; and history and politics.

Changes are generally accepted in military schools, but they are much more difficult to implement in the field. The proper way for a major change to take place would be to change educational doctrine as soon as possible, shifting the emphasis from adaptation education to creative education. This transition would be connected to deep changes in the content of education values and would not be the only issue.

The success of reforms is strictly related to conditions within three main areas:[6]

- Nationwide educational reforms.
- Significant changes in shaping personal politics.
- Senior leader acceptance.

These proposed changes should be implemented to facilitate the inculcation of creative leadership skills and to enhance leadership positions in the Polish army.

When implementing a new model of leadership, one pragmatic purpose is important: creating such a style of command by Polish officers and NCOs will meet basic NATO standards. This is of great importance in international partners' view of Polish soldiers. We strongly believe that Polish troops, who have served in international missions, have shown they are good soldiers. Currently, the most important fact is that creative leadership has been found to be a critical and valuable tool for future leaders.

Command and leadership are substantial issues for every army. U.S.

Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership,* states: "For you as an Army leader, leadership in combat is your primary mission and most important challenge. To meet the challenge, you must develop character and competence while achieving excellence."[7] In the case of Poland's armed forces, the issue is ever more important because its force is shrinking.[8]

According to Chief of Staff of the Polish Armed Forces General Henryk Szumski, "Our reform envisages that our Armed Forces be 50% professional. This means that the number of regular and on-contract soldiers will be between 80,000 and 90,000 while among the conscripts there will be between 16,000 and 18,000 reenlisted men. The structure of established strength will be 30% officers (1/3 senior officers), 30% senior NCOs, 40% other NCOs. Therefore, in the future, the number of positions for officers will be considerably reduced. It will be necessary to discharge from 12,000 to 15,000 officers in the course of five years and to enroll between 15,000 and 20,000 regular NCOs, doubling the size of the latter category."[9]

Leadership education and training is crucial, especially during a time when the officer corps is being downsized. To compensate for fewer officers, a stronger, more capable NCO corps must be created, educated, and trained. Well-educated and well-trained NCOs can support officers in all efforts of the Polish armed forces to face new challenges during the new century. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Enrico Magnani, "Poland: the New Army," *Rivista Militare,* no. 1, 1999, 26. According to the Chief of Staff of the Polish Defense General Henryk Szumski, approximately 5,000 soldiers speak English and more than 1,000 can speak it fluently.
2. Based on J. Lagodowski, "Military leadership—essence, education," Warsaw, 1997. ("Przywodztwo wojskowe—istota, ksztalcenie," Warszawa, 1997)
3. Magnani, 31.
4. B. Szulc and L. Kanarski, "Leadership in Commanding the Troops. Shaping Leadership Characteristics, Research, Officer-3," National Defense Academy, Warsaw, 1998. (Przywodztwo w dowodzeniu wojskami. Ksztaltowanie cech przywodczych, pk., Officer-3," Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa, 1998). Other characteristics include firmness, unfailingness, perseverance, resistance to hardship, enthusiasm, legitimacy, tact, and lack of private interest.
5. B. Szulc, "Leadership in Commanding the Troops," Warsaw, 1995. ("Przywodztwo w dowodzeniu wojskami," Warszawa, 1995)
6. Ibid.
7. U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 August 1999), 1-2.
8. Compared with 400,000 in the 1980s, future predictions of 180,000 make a big difference.
9. Magnani, 31-32.

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MR Almanac

Kosovo, 15 December 1998: The Battle That Wasn't

Lieutenant Colonel James K. Morningstar, U.S. Army

Every breaking headline makes it clear that today's soldiers are swimming in a sea of chaos. They must face warring factions, criminals, religious sects, and terrorists, becoming forlorn philosophers seeking to bring order to a disorderly universe. Too often they grab for the newest worldview, a *Weltanschauung,* as a lifeline to make sense of their environment and to allow them to place clear, precise arrows on a map to guide their operations. More often than not such theories, like philosophies, are easier to discuss than to apply.

Recent peacekeeping missions exemplify the chaotic environment of modern military operations, and many peacekeepers cling to information operations as a lifeline to order and success. Unfortunately, these operations have become, like Mark Twain's definition of a classic work of literature, something everyone owns and no one reads. There are many articles relating theoretical views, sometimes contradictory and often incomplete, on information operations in a peacekeeping environment.

This article, which adds to that slim body of lessons gathered through practical experience, documents the successful application of information operations in the chaotic peacekeeping operation in Brcko, Bosnia, by Task Force (TF) 1-8 of the U.S. Cavalry from September 1998 to March 1999.

Situation

In late summer 1998, TF 1-8's mission was to keep the peace among Serbs, Croats, and Muslim Bosnians near the divided city of Brcko in northern Bosnia. Goradze, Sarajevo, and Brcko were at the heart of issues that threatened to scuttle the Dayton Peace Accords. U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke said, "As tough as the first two [city arbitrations] were [to settle peacefully], we suspected that Brcko would be the most difficult of all."[1] He was right.

Competition for Brcko. When Bosnia was divided—however temporarily—between the Serbian Republik of Srpska (RS) and the Bosnian-Croatian Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, no one could agree on who "got" Brcko, so the final arbitration for carving up the city was delayed. In a geopolitical sense, Brcko was a vital 3-kilometer-wide link between the two halves of the Republik of Srpska.

The international community created a special supervisory position in the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to be held by Robert W. Farrand of the United States. Farrand

was vested with vast powers to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).

By the time TF 1-8 arrived, the arbitration had been twice delayed, and disagreement over the city's fate remained acute. The competition for Brcko threatened to destabilize the Peace Accords. In many ways Brcko was the test case for peacekeeping in all of Bosnia because it was where Farrand sought solutions for problems that faced the entire country.

Brcko's population was predominantly Bosnian before the war, but afterward, the Bosnians were mostly displaced by Orthodox Serbs. Although the OHR had some success in returning displaced Bosnians to their prewar homes in outlying suburban areas, the city remained home to Serbs who opposed resettlement. Despite this, Farrand succeeded in creating a roughly hewn multiethnic administration (MEA) within the city government, police department, and judiciary. Although many non-Serb MEA members still owned homes in Brcko, the Serbs who had been forced out of other parts of Bosnia still occupied those residences.

During the first few years of peace, the international community organized and enforced resettlement. Now, in Brcko, Farrand wanted the native authorities to take charge of resettlement. As early as 24 August 1998, Farrand asked Brcko municipal authorities to take the lead in returning non-Serb MEA members to their homes. Sadly, but not unexpectedly, Serb authorities tabled his request. As a result, Farrand, exercising his authoritative powers, issued orders on 3 November that directed municipal action to ensure the returns.

The OHR's orders were carefully worded to address two concerns. The first was to end the practice of multiple occupancy, whereby one family inhabited several properties that belonged to absentee owners. Second, the OHR wanted specific municipal action to return MEA members to Brcko. The OHR set three deadlines: 15 November 1998, for a report on compliance from municipal authorities; 30 November, for a special review panel; and 15 December, for the demonstration of complete compliance.

Although these actions were in accordance with the agreements RS authorities had signed and authorized, potential existed for a backlash. Task Force 1-8 planners could foresee that Serbs employed by the municipal government might stage events to cast blame on the international community for the eviction of war widows onto the snowy streets before the holidays. Such propaganda moves, captured on television and in newspapers, could play on Serbian feelings of victimization and stir up popular national sentiments before the final arbitration.

While task force leaders worked with the international community through the OHR to help implement the orders, another act played out on the Bosnian stage. On 13 November, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) evicted Yugoslavian Vice President Vosijlav Seselj from Bosnia. Seselj's history of personal opposition to the GFAP and his calls for violence had made him *persona non grata* to forces for peace.

Within two days, Seselj made more inflammatory comments, promising, "I will return to the RS. I will get hold of 10,000 baseball bats if need be. We will batter the SFOR with arms they won't be able to reply to."[2]

On 24 November, about 50 people from an association of Serbian war veterans rallied near the war memorial in central Brcko and marched on city hall. Task Force 1-8 was caught by surprise. In Bosnia, war veterans are particularly prized as supporters by hard-liners on all sides of the issues. This demonstration lasted about an hour and was designed to protest a lack of local government support for veterans' benefits. Although the rally remained nonviolent, it ended with an announcement that they, the demonstrators, would return in greater numbers on 15 December.

At that time, the fifteenth of any month in the Republik of Srpska was significant. At noon on that day of the month, by agreement with SFOR, the republic conducted a nationwide test of emergency sirens. In Brcko there were 14 sirens, the use of which instantly recalled the war to locals' minds. In August 1997, instigators in Brcko employed the sirens to agitate crowds in anti-Dayton Accords riots. The alignment of a veterans' demonstration and a siren test on the day when the municipal government had been told to show progress in enforcing OHR orders began to take on increasingly ominous overtones.

On 30 November, in the nearby town of Bijelina in the Russian sector 30 kilometers east of Brcko, another veterans' organization of over 400 people gathered in protest. What was announced to be a march for veterans' rights became a vocal protest against proposed property laws. Leaders marched the crowd to the vicinity of the international police task force's (IPTF's) local headquarters—the only Westerners in town—where they displayed several anti-American signs and chanted accompanying slogans.

This march coincided with Farrand's special review panel in Brcko where municipal authorities were to explain the system they would use to ensure resettlement. Instead, they produced a variety of excuses and finger-pointing accusations to justify no action at all. Furious, Farrand adjourned the meeting with an admonition to the Serbian representatives: "I see no progress, and I must tell you this is serious. Between yourselves, figure it out!"[3]

Within days another event occurred, unrelated to Brcko but having possible serious repercussions for task force operations in the town. On 2 December, while traveling from Bijelina toward Brcko, SFOR troops apprehended RS 3d Corps commander General Radislov Krstic, who was implicated in war crimes. The next day the task force received word that local Srpska Army units had been ordered to minimize contact with SFOR. The local Serbian commander became unreachable. The soldiers of an infantry brigade stationed in Brcko now became possible demonstrators themselves.

Shortly after Krstic's arrest, intelligence sources and IPTF members reported the arrival in Brkco of seven

known criminals from other Serbian areas. These thugs moved into a cafe located across the street from the OHR building, driving out the cafe's owner. To a military mind this development indicated a pre-positioning of hard-line Serbs in preparation for future actions. The situation did not improve; the international police reported unusually large numbers of military age males arriving in the regular bus traffic from Belgrade and Bijelina during that week.

An intelligence report on 4 December further darkened this picture. Sources said Seselj planned to appear at the Brcko rally on 15 December. Seselj had been condemning SFOR as an occupation force, a charge that recalled in the local population memories of the Nazis. The task force believed Seselj would try to infiltrate into town, appear among Serbs protesting their victimization, and dare SFOR to act. If he was thrown out, the occupation-force charges would be confirmed. If he was allowed to stay, he would claim victory over an impotent SFOR.

Justice for Brcko. That same day, at exactly the moment when the federation government convened its new session, events to the south added fuel to the fire. Bosnians staged demonstrations under the banner "Justice for Brcko" in Tuzla, Srebrenica, Sarajevo, and several smaller towns. Their demands were echoed among the Bosnian displaced persons camps throughout the task force sector where patrols were accustomed to the displaced Bosnians' litany of complaints—no water, fuel, or medical care. The Bosnians had increased threats to block SFOR supply routes, attack Bosnian Serbs, and even blow up their own homes in Brcko along with their Serbian occupiers. Now, they revealed a plan to go to Brcko en masse to visit their old homes—on 15 December.

The coincidence of the federation rallies occurring on 15 December, at the same time the government convened, brought to mind another motivation for violence. The Serbian veterans' rally would coincide with the scheduled discussion of Brcko by the international community at the 1998 Madrid Conference.

Planning

For operations in Bosnia, TF 1-8 found valuable advice in Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu's words, "The supreme excellence in war is to attack the enemy's plans. . . . Next best is to disrupt his alliances. . . . The next best is to attack his army."[4] U.S. Army TF 1-8 commander Lieutenant Colonel Mike Ryan paraphrased this guidance in simple words: defeat a situation before it begins.

In October, TF 1-8 faced its first antiresettlement demonstration, which was conducted by approximately 40 people in the suburb of Ivici, just outside Brcko, where the day before 12 women and children protested peacefully. The task force flooded Ivici with patrols whose objective was to identify the cause and intent of the demonstration. The patrols learned that the Serbian inhabitants had been told by some "shadowy" figure that they were soon to be evicted in favor of returning Bosnians and that Farrand would soon arrive to discuss the evictions. Forty Serbs gathered to greet Farrand only to meet a busload of Bosnians Muslims who had come peacefully to clear the rubble from their former homes. The situation was a ready-made confrontation.

Defusing the situation. An analysis of the situation revealed a striking similarity with Serbian behavior documented in the spring. Small gatherings grew larger over time and eventually resulted in two and one-half months of unrest that left one person dead and several buildings damaged. This time, TF 1-8 and the OHR deconstructed the Ivici Serbs' motivations and averted further violence. Rubble-clearing operations were suspended. TF 1-8 patrols and OHR representatives repeatedly met with local leaders to keep them calm. The message was twofold: locals would not be victimized, and the shadowy figures were liars who hoped to cause trouble.

Following the events in Ivici, TF 1-8 stepped up contacts with grassroots leaders. In November this effort helped the task force stay ahead of events. Task force representatives, attending a town meeting in the suburb of Dizdarusa south of Brcko, spotted several agitators spreading false information about resettlement and inciting violence, going so far as to boast of intentions to kill Bosnians. Were these the shadowy figures at work?

The task force responded with an aggressive presence operation designed to suppress demonstrations before they began. Task force personnel were armed with cameras and took photographs of the agitators. The next day, the company commander responsible for the Dizdarusa sector visited the homes of the photographed agitators and told them politely that the SFOR would not tolerate threats to peace.

The agitators went to the OHR to complain of SFOR Gestapo tactics, but Farrand knew better. Ryan went to local leaders known to hold influence over the agitators and told them they would to be held personally responsible for getting agitators in line. Patrols continued to say hello to each of the agitators when encountered, and once the light of notoriety began to shine on them, they ceased to agitate.

Lessons learned. Task force planners learned many lessons from these experiences and tried to apply them to the potentially inflammable convergence of events in December. In Ivici, the task force had reacted to events; in Dizdarusa, it responded to indicators. Now, TF 1-8 wanted to set the conditions to prevent threats to peace from materializing. The test would come on 15 December.

The task force learned to view the "peacekeeping battlefield" in depth as or before events occurred. Serious events nearly always resulted from orders by the power players in Banja Luka or Belgrade. They often indicated their intentions through the local media. Local leaders set events in motion long before they were to occur. Agitators spent days drumming up local popular support. Finally, the event itself required a logistical support process that required time and effort to unfold. Knowing what to look for helped the task force interdict the process of violence and prevent an event from occurring.

One of the primary lessons from

these earlier operations is that no events that threatened the peace in Brcko occurred by accident. Just as with the military, "soldiers"—the people on the street—took orders from higher authorities, who set conditions on the battlefield by manipulating public opinion. The public's mood formed the tactical center of gravity, where information operations are essential.

To be effective, information operations must be more than simply passing information. A message affects various audiences differently. The message that "all current *legal* occupants of residences will not be evicted" might be encountered with suspicion, but it would put an end to demonstrations. The message that "only *illegal* occupants will face the possibility of relocation to alternate housing" limits protest to a certain portion of the population. The message that "your city government, not the international community, is executing this action" would direct any protest toward the city government, not toward the international community. In Brcko, the messages were tailored to achieve particular reactions from various segments of the population.

The task force also learned that an audience's willingness and ability to accept and transmit information is proportional to a combination of message characteristics—the type of media used, the population's bias, the message's simplicity, and the messenger's credibility. For decisive results, planners must carefully consider and identify these factors within an intelligence preparation of the battlespace report before the execution of information operations.

In fluid dynamics, flow can be laminar or turbulent. The same can be said of information flow. Messages, delivered independently by several messengers to a population, will travel with various speeds and might be accepted or rejected by the receiver. Because each messenger and the means used to relay the message have unique characteristics, turbulence is guaranteed. Laminar results grow from a united effort to deliver the right information to the right audience by the right means. Achieving the optimal reaction from information requires that all messengers and their messages are coordinated. This necessitates a common, synchronized direction of effort not possible when actors in each environmental subsystem go their own way.

Information operations are only part of peacekeeping operations. Credible force, the most effective message on the field, results from the ability and willingness to use force, and from time to time, this ability must be demonstrated. Peacekeeping forces must also conduct operations designed to promote credibility of *intent.* Humanitarian operations and other physical manifestations of good will reinforce influence over the collective mood of the people.

Operations

Before the veterans held the 24 November rally, TF 1-8 was already on the battlefield of public opinion. Events in Ivici and Dizdarusa proved that this was where the center of gravity lay for mission success or failure.

Information operations campaign. In Brcko, OHR orders added urgency to the everyday battle against disinformation in the general population. Before agitators could begin to distort the effect of the orders, the task force began an information operations campaign to deliver the truth to the people of the city. Working closely with the chief of resettlement from OHR, the task force crafted its messages, deciding not to completely stop popular will to protest. After all, in democracies, demonstrations are proof of freedom of speech. Rather, the task force tried to influence local perception by emphasizing several key points through a tailored, four-point message:

1. The GFAP, as signed by RS authorities, guaranteed individuals the freedom to choose their location of residence and their right to return to prewar homes.

2. The supervisory orders required the municipal government to enforce existing RS laws and to take control of housing units from illegal occupants.

3. Any Brcko resident who illegally shared another family's prewar residence or illegally resided in the prewar home of a multiethnic government employee was to be *relocated* (not *evicted*) from their current residences *to another home.*

4. Farrand would stand by his commitment not to evict but to relocate any legal temporary residents *only* if sufficient alternative housing was not available.

The task force sought contact with people on the street to identify popular misperceptions, then correct them. The task force maximized use of local television, radio, and public meetings with local authorities to defeat any disinformation campaign before it could begin. The goal was to *inoculate* the population against agitators.

Seselj's eviction in mid November could have complicated local efforts. He was a popular figure in some quarters and a symbol of Serbian nationalism. His comments threatening SFOR, however, were of great aid to the task force's cause by helping the higher command focus on the deep fight.

When the veterans announced their planned march, the task force passed along concerns that Seselj might choose this time to return to Bosnia. When the task force received intelligence reports indicating Seselj harbored just such an idea, it voiced its concerns and learned of higher level efforts to discourage national figures from using the march for troublemaking purposes.

Benefits of cooperation. To defeat attempts by agitators to portray SFOR as an occupation force, the task force stepped up efforts to advertise the benefits of its presence to the general population. Presence patrols, civil affairs sections, and psychological operations teams visited schools, homes, and other locales where citizens gathered, donating goods and supplies. The task force also began long-overdue repairs to the road between Camp McGovern and Brcko—a section of road many locals traveled. At Thanksgiving the task force played host to local authorities, prominent citizens, and other leaders at a gala dinner in the military dining facility. Besides fostering communication between lo-

cals, the visit impressed them with the task force's professionalism and readiness.

While the task force's main effort was in Brcko, it also conducted a deliberate effort in the displaced persons camps south of the inter-entity border line, where it delivered a message designed to cut off trouble before it began. Presence patrols visited all camps, actively sought out complaints on the resettlement process, and identified and photographed agitators and leaders. Camp residents' concerns were passed to proper international organizations, and the task force delivered a message tailored for the leaders: avoid actions that will harm your cause.

The task force explained also the ongoing resettlement and arbitration process; showed that the process was working, although slowly; and explained that any acts of violence would destabilize the process. It warned that SFOR would not tolerate acts of violence or disruption of main supply routes. Finally, the task force told displaced persons that a mass resettlement in Brcko would not be allowed on 15 December if doing so would evoke a violent response from the Serbs.

The veterans' rallies in Bijelina at the end of November drew considerable task force attention. Although the task force could not personally collect intelligence on the demonstrations, the joint commission officers in Brcko were able to pass descriptions of the rallies they received from their counterparts in Bijelina. IPTF officers delivered additional reports. From this information, TF 1-8 could template the anticipated demonstration in Brcko on 15 December and identify several of the demonstration's leaders in Bijelina. If these same leaders appeared in Brcko, the task force would know that the demonstration would not be about local issues but for some other purpose. Their presence would serve as an early warning to trigger preventive actions by the task force.

Following the 24 November rally, the task force began to set the conditions for success on 15 December. The task force stepped up meetings with local government and law enforcement officials, letting them know they would be held responsible for any failures to avoid violent demonstrations.

Ironically, efforts to coerce assistance were reinforced by Krstic's arrest. The task force found that all local leaders were terrified about the existence of a "secret PIFWC [persons indicted for war crimes] list." Almost all of them had personal reasons to fear that their names might be included.

At the time of Krstic's arrest, the task force was about to host a major agricultural seminar in Brcko. In the wake of Krstic's arrest, the task force received instruction to minimize its presence. *This was exactly the wrong thing to do.* Such action would have indicated temerity about potential threats and would have displayed defensiveness about SFOR's action. The task force's credibility depended on its willingness to act. To demonstrate resolve, the task force had to project the message that there was nothing unusual about a war criminal being apprehended. With higher headquarters' approval, the task force held the agricultural seminar, albeit with extra precautions, and stepped up presence operations and contacts with local authorities.

To defuse potential trouble, the task force intensified operations to ensure the safety of persons designated for protection. The task force achieved unprecedented success in bringing many international community members into the base camp for protection during crises.

The task force also investigated every siren in town, all of which were controlled, by physical or authoritative means, from the office of the local minister of defense. The task force S3 visited and warned the minister not to use the sirens on 15 December. When the minister argued that a national law required the tests, the S3 told him that any use of the sirens would be perceived as a threat to the SFOR and that he would be held responsible. The minister contacted his superiors and agreed that a siren test in December was unnecessary. However, the task force prepared contingency plans to physically turn off or destroy sirens if necessary.

A serendipitous event played into the task force's preparations. The division had planned a training event, called Exercise Joint Resolve, in the Brcko area of operations to exercise the movement of reserves in support of contingencies. The exercise enabled the task force to bring the Multinational Specialization Unit and several allied companies to the Brcko area. Division headquarters agreed to employ these reserves on 15 December in a manner that would discourage violent demonstrations. As soon as the exercise was confirmed, the task force began to advertise it as a means to further deter violence. If the worst happened, SFOR was prepared to handle it.

With all the pieces in place, the task force spent the days before the demonstration focusing on the veterans. The task force commander began bilateral discussions with leaders of organizations like the Chetniks, who had great influence over the veterans, and task force civil affairs sections also met with the veterans.

On 14 December, the local veterans' group leaders called off their protest. Intelligence sources reported that approximately 50 veterans from out of town had arrived for the march and were intent on continuing. Still, the task force deemed this number to be too small as to embarrass someone like Seselj if he appeared.

On 15 December, hundreds of multinational SFOR personnel were deployed around Brcko as part of Exercise Joint Resolve. Division and brigade leaders operated tactical command posts within a stone's throw from the task force's operations center. Local police were alert and ready for trouble. Contingency patrols stood ready.

No demonstrations materialized. The day passed as quietly as any other. There was order in place of chaos.

The Battle That Wasn't

To the task force, 15 December turned out to be the battle that wasn't. Afterward, some leaders wondered if the task force had overreacted. In fact, the task force had done its job, reaching a high level of proficiency in prepping the peacekeeping

battlefield with a high volume of tailored information operations. Less than three months later, such methods proved their value.

Within days of the announcement of the final Brcko arbitration, the OHR removed the duly elected SR president from office. The task force seized huge quantities of Serbian military weaponry being smuggled through Brcko, and a Serbian civilian was shot and killed by nearby U.S. forces. Experts predicted the Serbs in Brcko would explode in violence. Instead, task-force operations had inoculated the population from the germ of agitation. Small groups of protesters demonstrated on several consecutive afternoons, but they could get no traction among the local population. Only then did the task force know for certain that it had, indeed, successfully conducted its peacekeeping mission. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Richard E. Holbrooke, *To End a War: The Inside Story from Sarajevo to Dayton* (New York: Random House, 1998), 273.
2. Ibid.
3. TF 1-8 notes, Special Review Panel, 30 November 1998, Brcko, Bosnia.
4. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1989).

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MR Review Essay

The Transformation of U.S. Air Power

Major Tom James, U.S. Army

Certainly the face of war has changed since the Vietnam War. Two informative, well-researched books that chronologically depict and discuss events involved in this change in regard to the U.S. Air Force were published in 2000. They incorporate the most up-to-date gathering of current historical research material and issues of debate on their topics.

Benjamin S. Lambeth's book, *The Transformation of American Air Power* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2000), chronicles the considerable advances in the evolution of air power capabilities over the last two decades. The book establishes a foundation for Lambeth's assertion that Air Force assets in and of themselves "can now set the conditions for victory even from the outset of combat if applied to [their] fullest potential."

Wayne Thompson's book, *To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1973* (Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2000), looks in depth at political, geographical, and technological circumstances that affected U.S. bombing strategy and execution during the Vietnam War. Thompson explores a less normative vein than does Lambeth, concentrating with little conjecture on recounting facts. However, the final chapter, which correlates with Air Force operations in the 1990s, suggests some lessons for the aspiring military strategist. In many ways, Thompson's book represents a microcosm of Lambeth's subject.

Thompson, chief analyst at the U.S. Air Force History Support Office, served in the intelligence branch of the Army during the Vietnam War, where he was assigned to an Air Force intelligence station in Taiwan. Thompson participated in Operation Desert Storm as a member of the Checkmate planning group that devised what would become the foundation for the air campaign against Iraq.

Thompson later served as the senior historical adviser for the 1993 *Gulf War Air Power Survey.* Coupled with his detailed research of the Vietnam era, Thompson's experience gives him a unique, in-depth, first-hand perspective on how the Air Force had been transformed.

Like Thompson, Lambeth is a highly regarded military and air power academician who maintains close ties with the military, especially the Air Force. He was a senior staff member of RAND, the Santa Monica, California, think tank, for 25 years. From 1988 to 1990, he was RAND's Director of the International Security and Defense Policy Program.

Through his military affiliation, Lambeth has flown in many military aircraft for many types of missions, including operational training missions and live-fire exercises. He also attended the preeminent air tactical schools of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

Both authors appear to have conducted extensive research on their projects. Thompson seems to have maximized the use of primary sources. Lambeth tends to favor secondary sources, relying heavily on air power journals and periodicals. This weakens his argument's credibility on interservice issues by appearing one-sided.

Lambeth and Thompson can easily be described as members of the Air Force establishment and warrant suspicions of touting the Air Force line. To counter this accusation, and to their credit, both quite openly and actively solicit review and input from interservice and political experts. In an effort to ensure his book provides a fair, accurate depiction of his subject, Lambeth subjected his work to an especially grueling pre-publication shakedown. The effort was less than successful.

Lambeth chronologically reviews the Air Force's transformation as it

has tried to unshackle itself from the specter of the Vietnam War. As it began the transformation, the Air Force and the Department of Defense could see the fallacy of an all-or-nothing nuclear strategy that paid little attention to the conventional use of air power.

Lambeth attempts a balanced approach in examining motivations of the post-Vietnam Air Force that struggled to develop organizations and doctrine to meet the strategy of defeating the Warsaw Pact threat in Europe. He thoroughly details how Air Force and Army elements established effective, though often strained, working relationships to flesh out what would become the Army's AirLand Battle Doctrine. The dividends from the Air Force and Army's close bond in developing the organization, doctrine, and technology to achieve effectiveness were realized during the Gulf War. Lambeth attributes impediments to using air power to its full potential in the Balkans to misunderstanding and misapplication of the lessons learned from Vietnam and Desert Storm.

Current Air Power Issues

The heart of Lambeth's book is about current air power issues and what the transformation of air power means to military strategists. He wonders whether "air and space assets should continue to be viewed as support for surface forces." Or, can they "achieve strategic effects directly and thereby set the conditions for victory in joint warfare" in some circumstances?

These questions represent the essence of the tone and flow of Lambeth's book; it is diluted with qualifiers, filled with unvoiced but readily apparent insinuations, twisted with incongruent logic, and peppered with the fawning use of "joint" as a not-so-thick purple camouflage for strains of air power omnipotence. Such criticism should not be flippantly cast, but the more thoroughly I reviewed the book, the more examples I found that support my contention.

Lambeth packages his story of air power transformation with schizophrenic tension. On one level he seems to be an air power zealot reminiscent of Billy Mitchell, albeit in a more tactful manner. On another level, he extols the virtue of jointness, watering down air power's perceived effectiveness. He attempts to resolve this tension by carefully, almost painfully, choosing words and qualifiers in addressing the issues. Unfortunately, this muddles the important portion of his message: advances in technology provide the military with a more potent military force. The effect of which was readily apparent for the Air Force during Desert Storm for many contextual reasons.

His assertion that air and space assets "continue to be viewed as support for surface forces" establishes his own straw man argument. (Ironically he uses the straw man accusation, with merit, to counter the purported argument that the Air Force cannot guarantee success in all military situations as an independent force.) His statement begs the question: Viewed by whom? Politicians and ground force commanders have demonstrated time and again their understanding of the importance of air superiority and the strategic potential of air assets in quest of military objectives. Such generalizations reveal much about the biases in Lambeth's writing.

Ironically, Lambeth labels space as being incorrectly perceived by surface forces as a support asset. Many critics level this charge against the Air Force for stifling space expansion by viewing space as support for air power efforts. Lambeth takes some liberties in assuming air and space assets are inseparably linked, as though they should be considered as one. He even asserts that air power is accepted as shorthand for air and space power. The view that Air Force advocates vie for control of space assets and a more equal place at the Quadrennial Defense Review table is a popular one. However, abundant data exist which show that the trend of thinking about operations in space as applying to all services is not tied to only air assets.

Lambeth admirably concludes the chapter on space by noting that distinctions between air and space will continue to diminish with advancements in technology. As this occurs, space will become more integrated into terrestrial joint-force objectives. I would also apply these assertions to ground, sea, and air operations as space becomes more integrated.

Defining Air Power

I was encouraged to see Lambeth tackle the daunting task of defining air power. He offers a description of air power, using three bounding rules, but ultimately, he falls into the same incongruent, convoluted diatribe as before. His correlation of air power with doctrine, organization, training, and other attributes is certainly not uniquely applicable to air assets; it applies to all forms of warfare. He chastises "laymen and professionals alike" for imaging air power in terms of combat aircraft exclusively. Then, he thoughtfully includes Army attack helicopters and missiles in the air power equation but thoughtlessly omits Army transport, aeroscout, and early warning aircraft. These examples are indicative of the continued incongruent logic and subtle hypocrisy that fill the book.

What makes Lambeth's incongruent approach all the more frustrating is its distraction from his enlightened and eloquent treatment of issues surrounding the transformation of air power and, more important, military power in general. His discussion of "gratification without commitment" on the use of advanced technology weapons systems as a seductress to strategies of gradual escalation offers a valuable warning to all strategists. Lambeth's attacks on gradual escalation seem justifiable and dovetail well into arguments Thompson presents.

Lambeth offers insight into the problem of labeling air power targets in classical strategic and tactical terms based on platforms and spatial relation in the area of operations instead of on their desired operational effects. He expands this line of reasoning to offer convincing justification for declaring population and counterindustrial targeting as diminished in relevancy to modern air power strategy.

He correctly asserts that advances in technology allow the Air Force to gear attacks toward the enemy's

ability to wage war, which will often mean attacking the enemy's fielded forces. That technology provided the capability to effectively attack fielded forces in the Gulf War is indisputable. The same cannot be said for attacking camouflaged and covered fielded forces in Kosovo.

Intuitive to me is that, as Lambeth says, in some circumstance air power can set conditions for victory. However, I do not believe Lambeth provides a convincing argument to his basic premise. In the end, he seems insincere in his attempt at neutralizing parochial biases.

In keeping with the tenor of the book, I offer this bit of twisted logic. If the Air Force's technological advances are indeed so much greater than those of the other services and of presumed adversaries, it would seem reasonable to exploit this situation by shifting funding to the other services to help them advance so they would be on par with the Air Force. Or perhaps, it would be logical to more aggressively fund the shortcomings recognized in space and airlift within the Air Force itself. Lambeth's logic seems to support this notion.

A Clearer View

Thompson's detailed recounting of the air campaign against North Vietnam from 1966 to 1973 offers no startlingly new revelations about the political and military context of the Vietnam War. The book's importance lies in the use of previously classified documents and Thompson's personal involvement with primary sources from both wars. His skillful blending of source material provides riveting, informative coverage of the subject.

Thompson's close working relationship with air power heavyweights and Vietnam veterans is of particular value. His book is a well-developed, credible reinforcement of the circumstances involving the use of air power in North Vietnam. He proposes that air power could have "set the conditions for victory . . . from the outset of combat if [it had been] applied to its fullest potential." But, he concludes, this did not happen, mainly because of political constraints which the administrations of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon imposed. Thompson focuses in particular on Robert McNamara's approach of graduated escalation and how it affected bombing efforts by allowing North Vietnam time for adaptation.

The essence of Thompson's book is in his examination of how the U.S. military, in particular the Air Force, could best tackle the unique puzzle the war presented. This was, namely, how to achieve success "within constraints imposed by technical capabilities, by the physical geography of Southeast Asia, and by the changing complexity of the world's political geography."

Solutions to these problems were exacerbated within the military by a failure to establish a true single manager for air assets and for partitioning the area of operations into route packages. These actions led to artificial limitations in coordinating the most effective use of air assets.

The political implications of maintaining domestic and international support while not provoking China or Russia resulted in virtual zones of sanctuary around Hanoi, Haiphong, and along the Chinese border. North Vietnam realized the benefit of locating key elements of its air defense systems, including interceptor aircraft, in these zones. In this view of the Vietnam War as a limited war, U.S. politicians ceded air superiority in these critical areas. Political constraints formed a more effective barrier to U.S. air power in North Vietnam than did the Third Reich's integrated air defense system in Europe in 1942-1943.

Thompson admirably connects how political positioning and political opinion affected McNamara's hopeless strategy of gradual escalation during Operation Rolling Thunder. Other limitations hampered this strategy as well, including a lack of technical capabilities to fully exploit the strategy, a formidable North Vietnamese threat, rugged terrain, and an economy and fielded force less logistically dependent than most industrialized nations.

Ending with Johnson's term, Rolling Thunder gave way to struggles to bring the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table under Nixon's "secret plan," which included intensive, so-called covert, bombings in Cambodia. Under the guise of protective reaction, Nixon encouraged a policy of more aggressive bombing in the Red River Valley, leading to the Linebacker operations.

Thompson deftly weaves together the military and political fibers of the story of the Vietnam War, inferring the cause and effect by explaining the action, then stepping back to look at the circumstances leading to it, then evaluating the effect on both sides. In particular, he examines the U.S. view through the eyes of key political figures, generals, and pilots. Thompson seems to approve of Nixon's enthusiastic embrace of an aggressive bombing of the Red River Valley and key targets in North Vietnam. By stripping away many of the limitations that had been placed on air assets, air power finally came close to its full potential.

Technology's Effect

Throughout his review, Thompson examines the introduction of new technology and its effect on strategy and tactics. Laser-guided munitions provided better precision and more destruction per sortie. However, precision weapons in many ways exacerbated the problem of defeating the weather. They required good conditions for accurate delivery. Thompson shows that B-52s were effective all-weather night platforms whose introduction finally brought the effects of bombing to a level that convinced the North Vietnamese to undertake serious negotiations.

The painstaking evolutionary process of politics, strategy, doctrine, and technology led to a U.S. force more able to exploit the potential of air power. This culmination did not prevent South Vietnam's fall, but it did shake the Air Force loose from its focus on a single integrated operational plan, which helped the United States to be better prepared for the challenges of Desert Storm and the Balkan campaigns.

I question Thompson's implications that aggressive strategic bombing earlier in the war would have forced more substantial or timely negotiations. His research does not

show a strong causal relationship. He comes closer to the mark in his defense of the argument against gradual escalation on all fronts in the effort against North Vietnamese aggression toward South Vietnam. These issues are reconcilable under Lambeth's notion of focusing on fielded forces. Such thinking might serve as a justification for using B-52s in support of Khe Sanh rather than in the Red River Valley.

Perhaps one of the most memorable aspects of Thompson's book is his ability to humanize the stories of politics and the air campaigns. The book reads like a novel without losing its credibility as a historical accounting. I commend him for often memorializing crew members for heroism and sacrifice, although doing so adds little to the overall thesis. Yet, it brings alive the human dimension of his story, a facet often ignored in bodies of war research.

Recommendations

The strength of Lambeth's book lies in his enlightened, insightful commentary and consolidation of important air power issues. Although it is tainted by parochialism, his work is important. Unfortunately, I cannot recommend it to the busy military enthusiast. Readers should be on the lookout for a more clear-eyed, less-tortured telling of the story of the transformation of air power.

I enthusiastically recommend Thompson's book. His detailed analysis of the tremendous transformation of air power strategy, doctrine, and technical capability over the short time span of the Vietnam War offers an informative, fact-based, engrossing look at the bombing effort in North Vietnam. His ability to meld primary sources into a backdrop of heroism and sacrifice reinforces the justification for this book to be on every military professional's bookshelves. ***MR***

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Waging Modern War: The Future of Conflict

Major John A. Nagl, U.S. Army

The Kosovo conflict might well be the first war fought almost exclusively from the air. Ground forces arrived on the scene only as police forces. The conflict was also the first time a war was fought because of an international country's inhumane treatment of its own citizens.

General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe during the conflict, relates his part in NATO's first war in his book *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict.*[1] Although the book will win him few friends in the U.S. Army or in Washington, D.C., it might serve as a catalyst for change in both.

The majority of Clark's difficulties during the war in Kosovo sprang from just one of NATO's 19 countries—the United States. Clark highlights the twin difficulties of the Pentagon's inappropriate strategic culture and the U.S. government's lack of strategic vision.

Don't Want to Fight There

With a sense of resentment and amazement, Clark reports that Army leaders did everything they could to *not* fight the war in Kosovo. They resisted Clark at every step. After noting that success in war is often a matter of persistence, he ruefully states, "I would have preferred the target of my persistence to have been only the enemy, rather than the Pentagon as well."[2]

The problem goes back, as does so much in recent U.S. military history, to Vietnam. In military minds, the defeat in Southeast Asia was the result of politicians forcing U.S. Armed Forces to fight with one arm tied behind their backs and of a liberal media that turned the U.S. populace against the war. That explanation was soothing, but the truth was more complicated. The shibboleth of "no more Vietnams" demanded full national support for future conflicts. That, Clark says, would "seem to be a kind of naïve throwback to an earlier, simpler era of warfare that saw a relatively clear separation between the political and the military."[3]

The Persian Gulf War was just such a fight. Marked by military freedom to accomplish clear political objectives and remarkable public support at home, it became the model for how U.S. Armed Forces visualized the future of conflict. In Clark's words, "It gave us the only road map we could see clearly in the new, post-Cold War world."[4]

As military leaders at the Pentagon wrote war plans for that world (ironically, a task Clark performed in 1995 while serving on the joint staff), they prepared for renewed conflict in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula in a strategy known as "two major regional conflicts (MRCs)." The strategy focused on re-fighting the last war—in the Persian Gulf—and the one two wars before—in Korea. The strategy explicitly ignored the war in between—in Vietnam.

Vietnam had been a nasty fight with no easily identifiable enemy, no clear political guidance, no public consensus at home, in a battlefield complicated by the presence of noncombatants. The military was determined not to engage in such a conflict again. Unfortunately, U.S. adversaries refused to cooperate. Rather than providing the type of conflicts the U.S. military had prepared for, warfare in the post-Cold War world more closely resembled the Vietnam War than it did the Persian Gulf War.

Yet, the Department of Defense prepared inexorably for the kinds of conflicts it wanted to fight. In fact, when Clark wanted ground forces in

Kosovo, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Joe Ralston refused, citing the necessity to be prepared for an outbreak of war in Korea and in the Persian Gulf. Clark's incredulity is palpable: "The Chiefs were seriously considering withholding forces to be ready for the two nearly simultaneous hypothetical major theaters of war elsewhere, however unlikely, even if it caused the United States and NATO to lose the actual war in Europe."[5]

Clark expected the Army to be a strong advocate of a ground option when Serbian President Slobonan Milosevic's forces proved more resistant to air strikes than NATO had first believed likely. Clark was mistaken. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton and Chief of Staff of the Army Dennis Reimer were Clark's biggest foes as he struggled to develop a ground threat to increase the pressure on Serbian forces. In fact, in late 1998, when Clark warned Reimer that war might be brewing in Kosovo, Reimer remonstrated: "But we don't want to fight there!"—as if the war was Clark's idea rather than the result of Milosevic's policies.

Clark blames the Army's reluctance to risk being drawn into a war it did not want to fight for the failure to use Task Force Hawk, the Apache helicopter unit he deployed from Germany to Albania. The Apaches' intended use was to conduct direct attacks on Serbian ground forces engaged in ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which were difficult targets to strike with cruise missiles or from aircraft. However, Pentagon leaders continually refused permission for the use of the Apaches.

Late in the war, Clark desperately wanted to use the Apaches to support the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that was fighting to maintain control of Mount Pastrick, which would have been key terrain should a ground invasion of Kosovo prove necessary. Permission was again denied. Clark attempted to accomplish the same mission with air power, noting to a subordinate, "We're going to pay in blood, with our soldiers' lives, for any ground they lose over that crest."[6] Although the KLA ultimately held the hill with the help of allied air power, the outcome was in greater doubt and more costly in human lives than it should have been.

Running in Loose Sand

Because of a fear of excessive casualties, the U.S. Marines never conducted an amphibious assault against Saddam Hussein's forces in Iraq in 1991. Yet, their presence in the Persian Gulf tied down a substantial portion of Iraqi armed forces, thinning the line at the actual point of the allied invasion. Similarly, a ground force mobilizing for an invasion—even one that was never carried out—would have forced Milosevic to mass ground forces in defense. Massed ground forces make good targets for air attack, and forces that are dug in against a threatened attack do not have much time to conduct ethnic cleansing.

U.S. President Bill Clinton took these strategic advantages off the table. In a nationally televised address on the first night of the war, he announced that there was no intent to deploy U.S. ground forces against the Serbian army. Clark dryly notes that the statement became "an impediment within the U.S. channel to commencing ground force planning."[7]

Clark's superiors did not approve of the way he had waged NATO's first war. He was ignominiously fired just six weeks after winning the war. Ralston, the leading proponent of allowing air power to win the war without any use of ground troops, replaced Clark.

Other examples of how Clark was treated litter the book. One of the most telling scenes occurred at NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington, D.C., during a critical phase of the bombing campaign. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, concerned that Clark would want to bring up ground options in the event that the air war failed, tried to prevent NATO's supreme commander from attending the summit. NATO insisted that he attend anyway. After being blocked from the official receiving line, Clark became the center of an unofficial second line as European heads of state gathered around him to discuss the conduct of the war. Clark is remarkably restrained when he describes his fate: "Operating without a clear, agreed strategy or a strong, unified Washington . . . was like running in the loose sand on the beach."[8]

Waging Modern War

"Modern war" is war in which vital national interests are not at stake, but in which democracies intervene to safeguard human rights or to prevent the spread of conflict in civil wars or in failed states. Clark believes that these conflicts are far more likely in the post-Cold War world than are MTWs on which U.S. national military strategy is currently based.

The 30 September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, released in the wake of the 11 September attacks on America, modifies U.S. strategy substantially. The new policy requires the military to fight and win one major war, hold the enemy in another conflict, protect the continental United States, and engage in smaller peacekeeping contingencies. A military able to perform these tasks will likely look quite different from today's military. It might be larger, more expensive, and more capable of waging and winning the modern wars the military would prefer not to fight. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001).
2. Ibid., 321.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 19.
5. Ibid., 313.
6. Ibid., 335.
7. Ibid., 206.
8. Ibid., 248.

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MR Book Reviews

EASTWARD TO TARTARY: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, Robert D. Kaplan, Random House, New York, 2000, 364 pages, $24.95.

The New York Times Book Review describes Robert D. Kaplan as "an American master of travel writing from hell." And, reading *Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus* is not a prescription for feeling good about the future of what Kaplan calls "the new Near East." Nonetheless, Kaplan's extraordinary sense of history and appreciation for the realities of power politics places this book on the must-read list for today's Army officers.

Kaplan steps into the remains of the Ottoman and Russian empires from Budapest. The region contains 70 percent of the world's oil, 40 percent of the natural gas, and "too much history," which when mixed with a steadily increasing population of 15 to 30-year-old men, poses potential trouble for the West: "Follow this age group to find the path of future conflict."

Increasing urbanization throughout the region has shattered traditional loyalties and created a rootless, volatile class of unemployed youth. Yet, traditional governments have not evolved to meet the needs of their better educated, more demanding population. "Powder keg" is not a sufficient metaphor; think "house of cards."

But if the Middle East is a disaster waiting to happen, the Caucasus is a cataclysm. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia have experienced ethnic conflict in the last decade that easily equals the horrors of the fall of Yugoslavia. The region's distance from Europe and proximity to Russia diminished Western attention to that genocide, but "now, because of the natural gas fields . . . , this area is again worth a war."

Kaplan provides a necessary correction to the prophets of globalization as international salvation; he is in some ways the anti-Friedman. In the New Near East, democratization does not inevitably increase stability; the opposite is more likely. He says, "Freedom and democracy certainly make for the strongest states, but with so little to build upon in this part of the world, civil society will likely be introduced only by force and Machiavellian tactics. . . . Even so, the chances of success are not great." In much of the region, only autocratic leaders are keeping the façade of statehood together in the absence of a free press and a middle class.

The preface to *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (St. Martin's Press, NY, 1993), Kaplan's best-known work, concludes: "Throughout the 1980s I tried—usually to no avail—to interest editors and the general public in the Balkans and the brewing trouble there. It is sadly ironic that my worst fears have proved correct."

I am willing to bet that in 10 years U.S. troops will have fought a war and still be deployed in several of the countries Kaplan describes in *Eastward to Tartary.* Any takers?

MAJ John A. Nagl, *USA*,
Fort Riley, Kansas

AMERICAN AIRPOWER STRATEGY IN KOREA: 1950-1953, Conrad C. Crane, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2000, 252 pages, $35.00.

In early 1950, U.S. Air Force commanders believed they could use strategic bombing to destroy critical North Korean infrastructure and break the North Koreans' will. In reality, the United States faced an enemy who resisted at all costs, so the Air Force had to learn new ways to fight. The result was improved acquisition and targeting systems, which enhanced U.S. military status as a superpower and led to the Air Force's transformation. The lessons learned are still relevant.

MAJ Barry J. Williams, *USA*,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

PATRIOT HEARTS: An Anthology of American Patriotism, William T. Coffey, ed., Purple Mountain Publishing, Colorado Springs, CO, 2000, 430 pages, $23.95.

William T. Coffey, an Army Reserve major, has been collecting quotes, anecdotes, personal stories, speeches, poems, and reminiscences for 17 years. He tucked them into his professional kit bag to serve as his personal collection of thoughts that exemplify the highest standards of what it means to be an American and the sacrifices men and women make to defend the country. He has chosen well, organizing the disparate selections into topical chapters to make them easy to read and reference. Of additional help are the short introductory paragraphs to each chapter. They define the chapter's theme and help readers understand why he chose a particular set of ideas (duty, integrity, and discipline; training, honor, and honoring) and what these ideas mean to him in the context of patriotism.

The most compelling and evocative parts of the book are the words of the men and women who have "been there." The readers should savor Colonel Dandridge "Mike" Malone's piece called "Soldier," which contains an excellent description of "all these wondrous things, which thousands of us share in whole or in part" as soldiers. "The Courage of Sam Bird" is one of the finest tributes to leadership at the unit level I have ever read. There are also lighter moments, as in "War is tough; it's tougher if you're stupid," and the profoundly simple, "When fear kicks in, training takes over."

I am reluctant to make critical

comments about this fine book, but I would offer some suggestions for a future volume. Coffey cites the source for each of his selections, usually with the author's name and the source's date, but many have no other descriptions. One asks, Who are these people?

I would be leery also of taking Internet quotes at face value. For example, "America: The Good Neighbor" was not written as recently as one might believe: A Canadian wrote it in 1974. I would also recommend ensuring that quotes are researched. The "poem recited at the dedication of the U.S.S. *Arizona* memorial in 1962" is actually from Shakespeare's *Henry V* about the Battle of Agincourt.

Despite these things, this book is truly a keeper. The sentiments and convictions are timeless and will make you realize the importance of words that capture the spirit of the moment and that can truly inspire action.

COL Peter V. Huisking, ***USA, Retired, Sierra Vista, Arizona***

EDUCATING THE U.S. ARMY: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875-1905, T.R. Brereton, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2000, 297 pages, $45.00.

Arthur L. Wagner, one of the principal architects of the U.S. Army during the 20th Century, graduated a lackluster fortieth out of 43 in the West Point class of 1875. Only later did he emerge as the Army's leading intellectual force.

With other progressives of the time, Wagner was dedicated to professionalism and reform. His forward-looking thinking helped guide the Army through a period of rapid, tumultuous change. But, first and foremost, Wagner was an educator who advocated an integrated, progressive system of Army schools. He also was instrumental in elevating the Leavenworth school from a "kindergarten" to a college. T.R. Brereton paints a bleak picture of the Leavenworth curriculum before Wagner's arrival, illustrating effectively the content and methodology that turned the school around. Wagner's key to instruction was the "applicatory method," which today would be called the "practical exercise."

Wagner, who had a gift for effective writing, wrote two textbooks that guided officer education for 20 years. He succeeded in describing not only "what" but also "why." As a practical historian, he rooted doctrinal teachings firmly in historical experience. His greatest gift to the evolution of Army doctrine was a redefinition of combined arms. Wagner pushed hard and successfully for the abandonment of close-order, massed infantry in favor of "extended order" (dispersed) infantry tactics. In discussing these innovations, Brereton demonstrates a sound grasp of battlefield dynamics and the interrelationships between technology and doctrine.

There are several similarities between Wagner's era and that of today. Then, as now, the Army faced a cloudy future dominated by technological change and complicated by questions over the Army's mission. As Brereton demonstrates, Wagner's invaluable contribution to innovation involved the legitimization of education and intellectual pursuits, along with a forceful insistence that the Army's proper mission was warfighting on a modern battlefield. There is much to be learned from the transformation of 1900 that can illuminate current efforts at transformation. Reading this book is a place to begin.

Christopher R. Gabel, ***Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

KOSOVO: War and Revenge, Tim Judah, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2000, 348 pages, $37.50.

Tim Judah wrote the prize-winning book *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT) in 1997. His recent book, *Kosovo: War and Revenge,* although having received some acclaim, has a few problems. For example, he refers to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) as "the most successful guerrilla movement in modern history." Yet, his narrative leads the reader to a quite different conclusion.

In the beginning, the KLA, which had only 150 active members, did not have an overall commander or a coherent strategy. Its numbers grew when village militia suddenly emerged and took the KLA name, even though they often acted because of local politics and clan motivation rather than directives from KLA's leadership.

In 1998, the Yugoslav army drove most Albanian guerrillas into the mountains; only the October 1998 Holbrooke Agreement allowed the Albanians to reoccupy lost territory. Eventually KLA leaders claimed to have forced the Yugoslav army out of hiding and into the open for destruction by NATO bombers. This claim, Judah notes, appears to be sheer myth. In short, the KLA is far from being today's most successful guerrilla movement.

Ending on a negative note, the book reinforces the popular view of the Balkans as a reservoir of centuries-old communal hatreds. Serbs have commemorated the 1289 Battle of Kosovo for 610 years, and Judah suggests that their capacity for revenge can endure another 610 years. Such a bleak picture suggests that little good can come out of current actions.

Overall, Judah provides much information on the KLA's rise, the Rambouillet Conference, and the Allied Force. He also discusses the stirrings of a Kosovar Albanian identity distinct from the general Albanian population. The book complements Noel Malcolm's *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York University Press, 2000) and Marc Weller's *The Crisis in Kosovo, 1998-1999* (International Documents and Analyst Ltd., Cambridge, MA, 1999), where Albanian perspectives on the Kosovo problem receive ample coverage.

George W. Gawrych, ***Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

COVERED WITH GLORY: The 26th North Carolina Infantry at Gettysburg, Rod Gragg, HarperCollins Publishers Inc., New York, 2000, 320 pages, $27.50.

Covered with Glory, by award-winning historian Rod Gragg, is one of the most dramatic combat narratives ever written. Not only does Gragg concentrate on one of the best known units of the Army of Northern Virginia, he concentrates the story on a three-day period in July

1863 when the unit suffered 687 casualties. That equates to a staggering 85 percent casualty rate.

This history is also the story of the unit's charismatic 21-year-old Colonel Henry King Burgwyn, Jr., the "Boy Colonel of the Confederacy." Burgwyn graduated at age 18 with top honors from the University of North Carolina. Two years later he graduated from the Virginia Military Institute. Gragg chronicles Burgwyn's meteoric rise from drillmaster to commander of the 26th North Carolina Infantry to his premature death from a bullet that entered his side and pierced both lungs during the successful capture of McPherson's Ridge by the Tarheels. His death deprived the Confederacy of one of its most promising field officers.

Gragg's ability to put the reader on the battle line with the soldiers is phenomenal and is the book's greatest attribute. The book is literally impossible to put down. Its meticulously detailed notes and bibliography guarantee historical accuracy and illustrate the depth of Gragg's research, making this a valuable addition to any military professional's library.

COL James L. Speicher, *USA,*
Shawnee, Kansas

IN VALIANT COMPANY: Diggers in Battle—Korea 1950-51, Ben O'Dowd, Queensland University Press, Australia, 2000, 212 pages, $19.95.

Ben O'Dowd is a former Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) company commander commissioned on the field of battle. O'Dowd's book, *In Valiant Company,* highlights his unit's actions in Korea and is a testament to the men who served so valiantly.

After conducting "bandit suppression" operations, O'Dowd's regiment moved north into the main forces' drive to the Yalu. Airlifted from Taegu airstrip to Kimpo in C-119 "flying boxcars," the regiment continued north to Kaesong, joining the 8th Army as it pursued the shaken North Korean Army. When the 8th Army slowed to catch its breath, units went into nearby hills to confront the enemy.

After flitting in and out of the area, the Chinese finally appeared en masse. Aided by the severe Korean winter, the Chinese assault was successful. The RAR began its retreat, stopping only when it was back in South Korea. As the slow, agonizing movement north began again, the RAR recovered lost ground and moved toward a fairly stable line.

Although O'Dowd centers on what he and his company did, he still provides the bigger picture. The book easily shows why leadership is so important.

Peter Charles Unsinger,
San Jose State University, California

AMERICAN GENERALSHIP: Character is Everything—The Art of Command, Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2000, 365 pages, $34.95.

American Generalship is an excellent update of Edgar F. Puryear, Jr.'s noted 1971 work *Nineteen Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership* (Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1997). *Nineteen Stars,* a comparative study of the leadership styles of Generals George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and George S. Patton during World War II, examines how and why they became generals and details their leadership styles.

Although *American Generalship* repeats some of the information in *Nineteen Stars,* its focus is on post-World War II military leaders: Admiral William J. Crowe, Generals Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, John Meyer, Gordon Sullivan, David Jones, and W.L. Creech.

The characteristics and qualities Puryear identifies as absolutely essential for successful leadership are as follows:

- Selflessness.
- Willingness to accept responsibility.
- Possessing and developing the quality of "feel" or sixth sense.
- Aversion to yes men.
- Genuine consideration and concern for troops and others.
- The ability to delegate.
- Character, which Puryear feels is the most important.

Other important characteristics of good leadership are integrity, ambition, showmanship, loyalty, and professional reading and study. One of the significant commonalities among World War II and post-war senior officers is a love of reading, particularly of history and biography.

Whether leaders are born or made is often questioned. The general consensus is that people can be trained in most of the attributes required for leadership. Dedication is the prerequisite; it includes the willingness to make the sacrifices a military career demands.

My major criticism of the book is that it does not address some of the less-attractive aspects of the modern officer system—careerism, service politics, and "plain old" luck. However, everyone who aspires to leadership positions in the military should read this book. It has much to offer and is an excellent roadmap for individual officers.

LTC John A. Hardaway, *USA,*
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

CRUCIBLE OF WAR: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766, Fred Anderson, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2000, 862 pages, $40.00.

As Winston Churchill once pointed out, the Seven Years' War was the first true world war. In fact, it was more of a global war than was World War I; the latter was waged primarily in Europe, where France, Italy, Belgium, the United States, and Britain and its Commonwealth decisively defeated the Austro-German alliance. The Seven Years' War was waged in Europe, India, Africa, the West Indies, and North America, where it was called the French-Indian War and where it was truly decisive.

The French-Indian War began in 1754 when a young Virginia militia officer named George Washington tried to remove a small French encampment from disputed territory on the Ohio River. It was the fourth war in North America between Britain and France. The first three ended in truces and restoration of the status quo ante bellum and, except as personal tragedies, spilled blood, and spent treasure, had no real impact on history.

Author Fred Anderson adopts a politically correct, multicultural perspective on the Seven Years' War. For example, he portrays Marquis Louis Joseph Montcalm as being guilt-stricken by the way his Indian and Canadian allies tortured prisoners and killed noncombatants. His guilt came from imposing his Eurocentric views of warfare on Indians and Canadians. They were skilled in irregular operations but doomed to failure by the hopeless task of trying to fight at a numerical disadvantage and still win a conventional war.

Perhaps the greatest grand strategist in British history, William Pitt dramatically increased the size of the British Empire because he was not an imperialist at heart. Whereas others tried to dictate to the Americans, Pitt won their heartfelt support and cooperation because he treated them as allies, not subjects of the Crown.

Pitt mobilized New World manpower and money as none of his predecessors could and promised local legislatures reimbursement for expenses in the common cause. According to Anderson, the irony lies in the fact that Pitt was the one who sowed the seeds of destruction throughout much of the empire he created or preserved: Americans expected to be reimbursed, not taxed, after the war.

One can take issue with Anderson's multiculturalistic approach to the subject. Pitt to the contrary, the English army was not a multi-cultural institution. Still, I highly recommend this book.

Michael Pearlman, ***Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

HAP ARNOLD AND THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN AIRPOWER, Dik Alan Daso, Smithsonian Institution Press, Herndon, VA, 2000, 314 pages, $29.95.

Hap Arnold and the Evolution of American Airpower is the compelling biography of one of the architects and pioneers of the modern U.S. Air Force. When Henry H. Arnold graduated from West Point in 1907, his desire was to become a cavalryman. Thirty-nine years later, he commanded history's greatest aerial war machine and, in retirement, became the first and only General of the Air Force.

Author Dik Alan Saso, a career Air Force officer, paints a balanced portrait. Arnold was a complex, unassuming yet professional, officer who possessed great vision and imagination.

MAJ M.R. Pierce, ***Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

THE KINDER, GENTLER MILITARY: Can America's Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still Win Wars? Stephanie Gutmann, Scribner, New York, 2000, 300 pages, $25.00.

As stated in Stephanie Gutmann's introduction to *The Kinder, Gentler Military,* "One of the projects mesmerizing the brass throughout the nineties was the integration of women" into the military. She goes on to admit that "surely women have been in the forces . . . forever . . , but something new happened in the nineties in respect to the way the military handled women issues." That something, Gutmann claims, is that the U.S. military is being used as a social experiment for gender integration. Her premise is that this social experiment is counter to what the military intended—fighting the nation's wars in defense of its vital interests.

This book is a devastating critique of the military's sex-integration efforts. It reports how the U.S. Department of Defense allowed women "to come into basic training at dramatically lower fitness levels . . . climb lower walls, throw shorter distances, and carry lighter packs when they got there." After reading this book, it is difficult not to take a side on the issue of whether women should be in the military. It leaves me questioning if military readiness and national security has been trumped by the U.S. Armed Forces' gender integration.

This controversial book offers hard facts surrounding making the "force look like America." Gutmann presents arguments that are hard to refute. In the end, her plea is to allow males and females to live in a "real world" devoid of political correctness. According to Gutmann, the real world is one free of sexual recruitment quotas, gender-specific standards, and a restoration of time-proven warrior cultures. Only then, she submits, can we truly test the military's gender integration. Whether Gutmann is right or wrong, all military leaders should read this book.

LTC Dominic J. Caraccilo, ***USA, Fort Benning, Georgia***

THE NAPOLEON OPTIONS: Alternate Decisions of the Napoleonic Wars, Johnathan North, ed., Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2000, 221 pages, $34.95.

The Napoleon Options, written by 10 international authors, presents several great "maybes" of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The book focuses on a few pivotal episodes, gives them a historical twist, and explores in detail a possible alternate sequence of historical events. Rooted firmly in reality and projected from entirely factual events, these possibilities are played out as though they actually happened in dramatic narratives. The thoroughness and believability of the alternative futures keep readers engaged and eager to see what will happen if Napoleon succeeds at Waterloo.

Because Napoleon had such an impact on the formation of the modern world, these scenarios illustrate how alternate events might have shaped a radically different world. They graphically illustrate the role that chance plays in history and how even minor changes can have far-reaching consequences.

The military strategist will find this work of significant use only if he is grounded in the specifics of the actual events. Without a historical understanding of the Revolutionary or Napoleonic Wars, the reader can become confused as to what is historical fact and what is historical fiction.

A positive aspect for the military strategist is the realization that pivotal events can alter the strategic environment and that the ability to identify pivotal events marks the difference between a strategist and a novice. *The Napoleon Options* provides all military professionals with a common message—use caution: men in conflict shape the future.

MAJ Paul R. Walter, ***USA, Pulaski, New York***

MR Letters

Of Arab Descent

The date 11 September 2001 will be forever in the nation's collective emotion. All of us will remember what we were doing when we heard the news of the tragedy. We will all have stories to tell.

As a U.S. Naval Officer of Arab descent, I happened to be waiting at the south side of the Pentagon for the 0940 bus taking folks to Bolling Air Force Base. As the bus approached, I saw the tail of a plane plunging into the Pentagon. My mind did not register what had happened until a forceful wind shook the bus, and the driver floored it toward the air base.

Because I could not believe my own eyes, I had to ask other passengers if indeed that was a plane. Immediately, like many others, I thought of friends who were in the building, including a U.S. Air Force Episcopalian chaplain who was entering the Pentagon as I left to catch the bus. He said, "Hi, Youssef," as we passed each other. The chaplain and I had ridden the public transportation together for two weeks and had gotten acquainted. After the attack, I was truly worried about him. I found out later that he was safe. Thank God!

Many people ask me if I have been a target of harrassment. The following story sums up my experience. I was riding the Metro in uniform, as I do daily to go to work. A World War II Army veteran was among the passengers. He looked over my khakis, medals, and name tag, then said, "I know you are Arab-American, and I want to thank you for serving our nation." The gentleman noticed a few U.S. Army ribbons on my chest, and he recounted his service with contruction brigades during World War II. He wished he was younger so he could take part in the coming fight.

Walking to Anacostia Metro Station, Gallery Place, and other stations to get around Washington, I hear ordinary Americans say, "Good morning, Sir!" "Go get'em, lieutenant!" Such encounters make me darn proud to be an American in uniform and desire nothing more than to get on, alongside other Americans and colleagues, with the business of fighting this new war against humanity.

LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, *USN*,
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Editor's note: Lieutenant Aboul-Enein is a frequent contributor of book reviews and essays to the Military Review.

Millett versus Patrick: *A War to Be Won*

If I didn't respect your journal and your readers, I'd hardly bother to answer the peculiar review you published of the book Williamson "Wick" Murray and I wrote about World War II. We hope your readers will use their own judgment in evaluating *A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (Harvard University Press, New Haven, CT, 2000). Fortunately, there are many favorable reviews your readers can consult.

First, I am baffled by your choice of reviewer—a retired professor of chemistry at a Virginia college who happens to be a World War II veteran and something of a self-appointed historian and literary critic. Surely there are officers and scholars at Fort Leavenworth who have a better grasp on the subject.

Apparently, our major sin was not mentioning that James B. Patrick's engineer combat battalion won the Battle of the Bulge, but a close reading of his review produces another, more damning conclusion: he did not read the book. Some of his criticism is so bizarre that it defies reasoned response. For example, he criticizes us for somehow holding the Axis to a higher moral standard than we do the Allies when it comes to killing innocents and committing crimes against humanity. I think we certainly expressed our reservations about firebombing cities, the leveling of Manila by an American army, and every aspect of Soviet war making.

Patrick is incensed that we did not adequately evaluate the role of SIGINT in the war, yet the book is full of such commentary. Others have questioned our judgment (we give too little credit to the SIGINT impact), but not our willingness to deal with the subject.

As for our commentary about commanders of every nation, these judgments, however harsh, are based on a measured evaluation of the principals and are hardly novel or unfair to anyone who has kept up with the literature. For example, my hard judgment on General Douglas MacArthur is based on sympathetic work on him by Gavin Long, D. Clayton James, William Leary, and the biographers of every one of MacArthur's principal subordinates like George Kenney, Thomas Kinkaid, and Robert Eichelberger.

If Patrick really followed the literature, he would know that the charges by "Suvorov" that Josef Stalin set up his own army have been discredited years ago. Any evaluation of the Russo-German War must now be based on the work of Colonels David Glantz and Johnathan House and others (including the Russians) who have had access to Soviet military archives. Even the late General Dimitrii Volkaganov, biographer of Stalin and Lenin as well as victim of the Red Army purges, could find no convincing evidence of Stalin's cooperation with the Nazis.

In addition to basing his understanding of the war on Winston Churchill's self-serving classic, *The Second World War* (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1986, boxed edition), Patrick's own notes demonstrate his incompetence. For example, he attacks George C. Marshall (who "had never fought a battle," which will be news to students of the AEF from Cantigny to the Meuse-Argonne) for the Army's replacement system. While in the theory of command this may be so, the issue is a bit more complicated than Marshall's personal bias, and it is thoroughly discussed in the U.S. Army's official history of the war and several books—including two by my own students—in the last decade.

As for attitude, Murray and I apparently are not sufficiently paranoid since we don't take conspiracy theorists seriously enough, nor are we properly reverential to the men and women who fought World War II. The last charge is particularly

aggravating. I guess Patrick didn't read the dedication as well as most of the book. While I am not prepared to judge Patrick's military service or avocational interest in military affairs, I doubt that he has given quite as much service to the United States as two retired reserve officers (colonel, USMCR, and lieutenant colonel, USAFR), and professional historians who have dedicated their entire adult lives (and we are on the verge of drawing Social Security) to getting military history right. Happily, the World War II veterans who write us think we've done pretty well.

Allan R. Millett, ***Mason Professor of Military History, The Ohio State University, Columbus***

In response to Allan R. Millett's intemperate attack on my review of his and Williamson Murray's book, I need to revisit a few points. The first concerns the petty squabble about turf: how dare a mere chemist criticize the work of two celebrated history professors? The answer is simply that I was there and they were not. I have been reflecting on these events, reading what I could find about the war, and talking with other veterans since before Millett and Murray were in knee pants. No one can claim a complete understanding of that titanic catastrophe of Western civilization, and I certainly do not. But, as in most things, eyewitness testimony is not to be scorned, even by Ohio State University professors of history.

Millett claims to have given my review "a close reading," but he somehow reaches the astonishing conclusion that I think my engineer combat battalion won the Battle of the Bulge. We were not in it at all: we were in the 7th Army. Millett tops that whopper by claiming that I had not even read his book. I am distressed to see a distinguished scholar become so infuriated by a less-than-obsequious review that he could not read the review clearly.

Millett alleges that I am "incensed" that he and Murray "did not adequately evaluate the role of SIGINT." I am not only *not* incensed, I can find nothing in my review that concerns SIGINT except for a mention that the index has no entries for Enigma, Ultra, Magic, Purple, or Venona. I blame the publisher, not Millett and Murray, for not compiling a better index. When I said that Millett and Murray were "weak in their appreciation of the effects of intelligence," my examples were Richard Sorge's spying and James Klugmann's false reports.

In Millett and Murray's evaluation of the various commanders, there is room for reasonable disagreement. However, vilification such as calling the formal Japanese surrender on the U.S.S. *Missouri* "general-dramatist MacArthur's bit of *kabuki"* is simply contemptible. Such cheap shots have no place in serious scholarship.

Millet misunderstood Viktor Suvorov's thesis. Suvorov (Victor Rezun) never claimed that Russian leader Joseph Stalin "set up his own army." Rather, Suvorov postulated that Stalin intended a surprise attack on German dictator Adolf Hitler in 1941 but was beaten to the punch. Millett alleges, with no supporting reference, that this was "discredited years ago," but it is, in fact, still an open question. Gabriel Gorodetsky, in *Grand Delusion* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1999), briefly argues against the possibility, but acknowledges that Russian historian V.A. Nevezhin supports Suvorov's thesis. Nevezhin's book on the subject has not been translated and is unavailable in the United States. I understand that R.H.S. Stolfi, a former professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, claims in *Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted* (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991) that Stalin intended to initiate a Soviet "Barbarossa," but the Germans hit before it could be launched.

I have not yet read Stolfi's book, and I doubt that it will settle the question. However, I still believe that my comment that this thesis "makes more sense than the usual view of Stalin—of all people—as a gullible simpleton who was outfoxed by the crafty Hitler" is a reasonable one.

On the other hand, I fail to see the relevance of Millett's assertion that Dmitri Volkganov "could find no convincing evidence of Stalin's cooperation with the Nazis." Until June 1941, Stalin certainly did cooperate extensively, but after Barbarossa was launched, no one in his right mind would claim that he did. So, where's the beef?

Millett continues: "In addition to basing his understanding of the war on Winston S. Churchill's self-serving classic, *The Second World War,* Professor Patrick...." I regret that Millett was evidently so blinded by rage that he failed to recognize my distinctly negative assessment of Churchill's opus. Millett's characterization of it as a "self-serving classic" expresses my view quite well.

Millett continues by attacking my comment on U.S. General George C. Marshall by saying that I said Marshall "had never fought a battle." Millett continues that "this will be news to students of the AEF [American Expeditionary Force] from Cantigny to the Meuse-Argonne." What I actually said was that Marshall "had never fought *in* battle." Marshall was a staff officer. I do not disdain staff officers; they serve an essential purpose, and I was an adjutant shortly before I left the service in 1947. But, I cannot imagine Marshall as a staffer nicknamed something like "Old Blood and Guts," and try as I will, I cannot picture Marshall in a muddy uniform. Maybe that is unfair, but I wish Millett had read my review more carefully before calling down his barrage.

Millett's last paragraph is especially painful to contemplate. He seems to be reduced to the juvenile "nya, nya, I've got more service than you've got!" I hope that when he cools down we can get beyond such behavior.

Let me make it clear: I consider *A War to be Won* a good book, and I respect Millett and Murray. But the book is not as good as it could be, precisely because the authors are eminent authorities from whom something much better should be expected. As any unbiased reader of my review can see, much of my criticism was aimed at the book's publisher, who did not provide the clear maps, thorough proofreading, and complete index that a work of this scope and authoritative authorship demands.

Also, Millett and Murray were excessively flippant, not as complete in their coverage as they might have been, and overly judgmental in some instances. But, I understand that academics, like everyone else, have off days. If this book goes to a second edition—and I hope it will—the authors will have another opportunity to provide that elusive product—the definitive history of World War II. I hope that their resentment of my *lése majesté* will not deter them from seizing that opportunity.

James B. Patrick, ***Professor, Mary Baldwin College, Staunton, Virginia***